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I. INTRODUCTION

At common law, a husband was obligated to support his wife.' In part
this support was due to the fact that a married woman was limited in her
ability to own property and enter into contracts. 2 In an effort to protect
women who were abandoned by their husbands, the courts developed the
doctrine of necessaries. Under this doctrine a husband was liable to those
who provided necessary items and services to the wife, even though he had
not contracted for them.4 The husband's liability under the doctrine of
necessaries was based on the legal theories of restitution and
quasi-contract.5 As time passed, theories of marriage changed, and women
were accorded full rights to own property and execute contracts. 6 Despite
these changes in the law, the doctrine of necessaries remained as a
protection for wives who were dependent on their husbands.7
On December 21, 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida finally abrogated
the common law doctrine of necessaries in Florida in Connorv. Southwest
FloridaRegional Medical Center, Inc.8 The court found that the doctrine
violated equal protection principles. 9 Rather than extend the doctrine to
both genders, the court called on the legislature to decide if the doctrine of
necessaries should remain the public policy of the state.'" To date, the
legislature has not responded to this call."

1. See Mary Elizabeth Bora, Comment, Functions of Womanhood: The Doctrine of
Necessariesin Florida,47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397,400-01 (1992).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 398.
4. See id. at 401.
5. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1,4 (Ind. 1993).
6. See Borja, supra note 1, at 401-02.
7. See id. at 402.
8. 668 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1995).
9. See id. at 176-77. Equal protection is guaranteed by both the United States Constitution
and the Florida Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
10. See Connor,668 So. 2d at 177. The court had previously called upon the legislature to
consider whether the doctrine of necessaries should be extended to apply to both husbands and
wives in Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644,646 (Fla. 1986). In
Shands, the court noted that there was a potential equal protection infirmity in the common law
doctrine of necessaries, but refused to consider that issue because the hospital that raised it lacked
standing. See id. at 646 n.1.
11. In the past two regular legislative sessions, the legislature considered enacting versions
of the doctrine of necessaries. During the 1996 regular session, bills in both houses of the
legislature were introduced that stated: "The husband and wife are liable jointly and severally for
any debts contracted by either, while living together, for necessary household supplies of food,
clothing, and fuel, for medical care, and for shelter for themselves and family, and for the education
of their minor children." H.R. 1211, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (Fla.); S. 906, 1996 Leg., Reg.
Sess., § 1 (Fla.). During the 1997 regular session, the House of Representatives considered a bill
which provided that: "Hospital bills are considered family expenses in which the husband and wife,
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The purpose of this Note is to analyze the significance of the doctrine
of necessaries and determine if the legislature should enact law to replace
the abrogated doctrine. To this end, Part I of this Note examines the
history and development of the doctrine of necessaries, and the judicial
conception of marriage. Part IH analyzes several of the choices that the
legislature has in responding to the abrogation of the doctrine. Part IV
concludes that the legislature should pass legislation that at least partially
restores the doctrine of necessaries in Florida, with application to both
genders. An appendix includes two proposals for legislation that are based
on legislative and judicial response to this issue in other states.
1I. HISTORY

A. Coverture
The doctrine of necessaries owes its existence to the common law
doctrine of coverture. 2 Under the doctrine of coverture, a woman lost
many of her legal rights when she married. 3 A married woman was denied
the capacity to own property, to contract, or to sue or be sued. 4 Her
husband was allowed to exercise these rights on her behalf.15 This legal
disability placed a woman in a precarious position. 16Ifher husband chose
to abandon her, or not to purchase the things that she needed, she was

while living together, are jointly and severally liable for each other and their minor children." H.R.
349, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 12 (Fla.) (version dated Mar. 24, 1997). As of the beginning of the
1998 regular session, the bill is still being considered, but has been amended to remove the
provision holding spouses jointly and severally liable for hospital bills. See H.R. 349, 1998 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla.) (version dated Feb. 2, 1998).
12. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1993); Note, The
UnnecessaryDoctrineof Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 1770-72 & 1772 n.13 (1984).
13. See Borja, supra note 1, at 398.
14. See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 3.
15. See Marcus L. Moxley, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1987, VII.
FAMILY LAW: North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris: North Carolina Adopts a
Gender-NeutralApproachto the DoctrineofNecessaries, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1241, 1243-44(1988).
16. See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 3. The court considered the situation that coverture could
impose upon a woman:
Even this arrangement, however, had drawbacks apparent to common law courts, not
the least of which was the peril at which it placed wives whose husbands were
disinclined to honor their support obligations. Imagine, for example, the plight of a
gravely ill woman denied by law the ability to hire a doctor and married to a man who
refused to do so for her. In time, the common law developed the doctrine of
necessaries as a mechanism by which the duty of support could be enforced.
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helpless, or in legal terminology, necessitous. 7 The doctrine of coverture
prevented the wife 18from suing her husband to compel him to fulfill his
support obligation.
Eventually, however, coverture did not reflect society's expectations of
marriage, and states began to pass Married Women's Statutes.1 9 These
statutes enabled a married woman to own property, enter into contracts,
and sue or be sued as though she were single. 20 These statutes, however,
did not relieve a husband of his obligation to support his wife. 2' This was
because of the fact that, in most households, the man was still the primary
wage earner, and the wife continued to perform predominantly domestic
chores.22
With coverture abolished by the Married Women's Statutes, a wife was
afforded full legal rights.2 3 These full rights are more appropriate in a
society where most women work outside of the home, and are capable of
earning significant incomes.24 Due to increased equality in the marketplace,
women bring more of their own property into marriage.' A husband no
longer assumes all of his wife's legal rights.26
The courts have sought to find a way to characterize these changes in
marriage. A wife can no longer be considered merely a husband's agent.

17. See id.
18. See id. The doctrine of necessaries did not allow a woman to sue her husband. Rather, it
enabled her to use her husband's credit to purchase those items and services that were necessary.
See id. Creditors were then able to sue the husband under a theory of restitution or quasi-contract.
See id. at 4.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1997). The current Florida statute is derived from
legislation initially passed in 1943. See 1943 Fla. Laws ch. 21932. Florida first abrogated the
doctrine of coverture in the constitution of 1868. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 26 (1868); see also
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 708.08(1) (1997). This statute provides in part:
i Every married woman is empowered to take charge of and manage and control her
separate property, to contract and to be contracted with, to sue and be sued, to sell,
convey, transfer, mortgage, use, and pledge her real and personal property and to
make, execute, and deliver instruments of every character without the joinder or
consent of her husband in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried.
Id.
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 708.10(1) (1997).
22. See Bora, supra note 1, at 402.
23. See FRA. STAT. § 708.08 (1997); See also FLA. CONST.art. X., § 5 ('There shall be no
distinction between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or
encumbering of their property, both real and personal .... ).
24. See Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA
1980), overruledby Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
25. See id.
26. See id. (citing Merchant's Hostess Serv., Inc. v. Cain, 9 So. 2d 373, 375 (Fla. 1942)).
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Married women are able to act on their own behalf.27 Although each spouse
is able to act independently, married couples do tend to act together, and
frequently combine their resources, consolidating into a single economic
unit.28 One approach taken by courts in the area of family law is to
analogize marriages to partnerships.29 For instance, when spouses are
making an equitable distribution in the dissolution context, courts will
divide assets in much the same way as business partners would.30
B. The Doctrine ofNecessaries
The common law doctrine of necessaries began its development in
seventeenth century England. 31 As it developed under coverture, the
doctrine of necessaries was essentially a means for a wife to compel her
husband to support her.32 A married woman could purchase items and
services that were necessary to maintain her on her husband's credit.33 The
creditors were able to bring an action against the husband for payment,
even though he had never agreed to be held liable. 34 Liability was generally
founded on restitution and quasi-contract 3theories, but when appropriate
would also be based on agency principles. 1
The doctrine of necessaries had several limitations. 36 First, although the
husband would only be held liable to pay for those items and services that
were necessary, the definition of a necessary was somewhat broad. 7
Expectedly, food, clothing and shelter were considered necessaries.38
Additionally, medical and dental services were necessaries.39 Some courts

27. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E. 2d 1,3 (Ind. 1993).
28. See Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008, 1010
(N.J. 1980).
29. See id.; Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 668 So. 2d 175, 179 (Fla. 1995)
(Overton, J., dissenting).
30. See Connor, 668 So. 2d at 179 (Overton, J., dissenting).
31. See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.3,

at 265 & n.1 (2d ed. 1988).
32. See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 3.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 3-4.
35. See CLARK, supra note 31, § 6.3, at 265-66.
36. See, e.g., Davis v. Baxter CountyReg'l Hosp., 855 S.W.2d 303,305 (Ark. 1993) (stating
that when a creditor furnished necessaries solely on the credit of the wife, the husband was not
liable); Beers v. Public Health Trust, 468 So. 2d 995, 1001-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Nesbitt, J.,
dissenting) (stating that abandonment by spouse would prevent liability under the doctrine of
necessaries); Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 6, 9 (stating that at common law, the doctrine of necessaries
was limited to the husband's ability to pay and that marital misconduct ended both the duty to
support, and liability under the doctrine of necessaries).
37. See Note, The UnnecessaryDoctrineof Necessaries, supra note 12, at 1767 n.4.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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were also willing to treat as a necessary those items needed to maintain the
wife at her accustomed standard of living."
The second limitation on the doctrine was that the wife had to make the
purchases on her husband's credit.4 If the creditor looked to the wife's
own credit, then the husband would not be held liable for payment.42 The
creditor would be limited to his remedies against the wife.43 The creditor
carried the burden of showing that he had relied on the husband's credit.'
Additionally, the husband was not always held liable for the full
amount of every expense, that could be classified as a necessary. Instead,
the husband would only be held liable to the extent of his ability to pay. 6
The husband would not be put into debt for his wife's extravagant
purchases.47 One court held that where a wife was properly admitted to a
poorhouse,
the husband could not be held liable for necessaries provided
48
to her.
Another limitation on the doctrine involved a couple's separation when
the wife was at fault.49 If a wife abandoned her husband, the husband
would not be held liable for the purchase of necessaries after the
abandonment.5 0 Also, if the wife's scandalous behavior became notorious
in the community, the husband could not be held to pay for her purchases.5 '
Even with the doctrine of coverture abolished, the doctrine of
necessaries continues to be applied by many courts. 2 Courts are able to
apply the doctrine in a manner that is consistent with the partnership view
of marriage.53 Under a partnership view of marriage, the spouses have an
obligation to maintain the marriage partnership.54 The doctrine of

40. See id.
41. See Medical Bus. Assocs., Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d 890, 897 (App. Div. 1992).
42. See Runkel v. Southeast Palm Beach Hosp. Dist., 453 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA
1984).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 939.
45. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 1993).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Board of Comm'rs v. Hildebrand, I Ind. 555, 556 (1849).
49. See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 9.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 8; Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of
Baum,417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J. 1980); LandmarkMed. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145,1152-53
(R.I. 1994).
53. See Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d at 1008.
54. See Joan M. Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, PartnershipMarriage:The Solution to
an Ineffective and InequitableLaw of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 586-96 (1974) (concluding
that a partnership model of marriage based on community property law would provide greater
protection to spouses).
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necessaries provides the means for the enforcement of this obligation. 5
The doctrine of necessaries fits the expectations that many have of
marriage, 6 as well as the public policy of most states concerning spousal
support.57 States' public policy, in general, is that spouses will not be left
without support when the other spouse has the means to provide support. 8
Thus, a husband still has an obligation to support his wife. 9 Some laws
have changed so that a wife has a reciprocal duty to support her husband.'
The common law doctrine of necessaries did not reflect this change toward
a mutual obligation of support.6 Under the common law, there was no
obligation for a wife to pay for the necessaries provided to her husband.6
Eventually, the common law doctrine of necessaries was challenged as
a violation of equal protection principles. 3 Courts had two options for
solving this problem. Some courts expanded the doctrine to apply to both
spouses." A few courts have refrained from what they see as a sweeping
change, and instead, abrogated the doctrine-leaving it to the legislature
to decide if the doctrine should be re-enacted with application to both
husbands and wives. 5
55. See Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d at 1008-09.
56. See id. at 1010.
57. See, e.g., Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 668 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 1995).
58. See, e.g., Landmark Med. Ctr. V. Gauthier, 635 A. 2d 1145, 1152 (R.I. 1994).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 708.10(1) (1997).
60. See, e.g., Connor,668 So. 2d at 176.
61. See id. at 175-76.
62. See id.This made sense historically, because under coverture, the husband had ownership
and control over all of the property, and the wife had no ability to pay for the necessary expenses.
See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 3.
63. See Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A. 2d 1003, 1006 (N.J.
1980). In 1980, the Supreme Court of New Jersey became the first state supreme court to address
the issue and expanded the doctrine to apply equally to both spouses. See id. at 1010. On the last
day of 1980, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida also expanded the doctrine to apply
to both spouses. See Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.
2d DCA 1980). The Manatee decision was later overruled by the Supreme Court of Florida in two
cases: Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986), and Connor
v. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., 668 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1995).
64. In most states where courts have addressed the issue, the courts have expanded the
doctrine to hold a wife liable for necessaries provided to her husband. See, e.g., Bartrom, 618
N.E.2d at 8; St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Kan. 1992); Borgess
Med. Ctr. v. Smith, 386 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Hulse v. Warren, 777 S.W.2d
319,322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344,1347 (N.H. 1995);
Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d at 1010; Medical Bus. Assocs., Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 890, 897
(App. Div. 1992); North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471,474 (N.C. 1987);
Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1152-53 (R.I. 1994); Richland Mem'l Hosp. v.
Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12, 13 (S.C. 1984); Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tenn. 1983);
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Wisc. 1982).
65. Relatively few states have abrogated the doctrine. See Emmanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d
578,579-80 (Ala. 1992); Connor,668 So. 2d at 177; Condore v. Prince George's County, Md., 425
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C. Challengesto the Doctrine in Florida
In Florida, the district courts of appeal did not agree on how to deal
with the equal protection problem. The first court to address the issue was
66
the Second District in Manatee ConvalescentCenter,Inc. v. McDonald.
In Manatee, a hospital appealed the dismissal of its complaint against a
wife for payment of her husband's medical expenses.67 In deciding to
extend the doctrine of necessaries and hold the wife liable, 8 the court
stated that "[cIhanging times demand reexamination of seemingly
unchangeable legal dogma. Equality under law and even handed treatment
of the sexes in the modem market place must also carry the burden of
responsibility which goes with the benefits. 69
Shortly thereafter, the Third District agreed with the Manatee decision
in Parkway GeneralHospital,Inc. v. Stern.70 The court stated that "a wife
is liable for her husband's bills simply and solely because of the marital
relationship between them. Thus, the only ways in which [the wife] ...
could have averted this responsibility was to have dissolved the marriage
before her husband's
hospitalization or somehow prevented the illness
7
which required it." '
The First District was the next court to address the issue. In Shands
TeachingHospital& Clinics,Inc. v. Smith,72 the First District affirmed the
dismissal of a hospital's suit to recover medical expenses from a patient's
wife.73 The court declined to extend the doctrine, stating that the decision
to do so was better left to the supreme court or the legislature.74 Judge
Barfield wrote a concurring opinion that accused the Manatee
and
7
Parkway courts of "elitist and dangerous" judicial activism.
The Supreme Court of Florida granted review to resolve the conflict
between Shands, which refused to extend the doctrine, and Manatee and
Parkway,which extended the doctrine.76 The court refused to acknowledge

A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981); Govan v. Medical Credit Servs., Inc., 621 So. 2d 928, 931 (Miss.
1993); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E.2d 905, 908 (Va. 1983). The
Virginia legislature has subsequently enacted legislation applying the doctrine of necessaries to
both spouses. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1997).
66. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
67. See id. at 1356.
68. See id. at 1359.
69. Id. at 1358.
70. 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
71. Id. at 167.
72. 480 So. 2d 1366 (1st DCA 1985), affid, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1369-70 (Barfield, J., concurring).
76. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1986).
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an implied-in-law contract' between the hospital and the wife for medical
services provided to her husband, claiming that such an extension of the
law was better left to the legislature.78 The court also ruled that the hospital
did not have standing to raise the equal protection argument in favor of
expanding the doctrine of necessaries.79 Thus, in Shands, the supreme court
refused to expand the doctrine of necessaries, but also did not abrogate the
doctrine, leaving the common law doctrine intact.8" The court called upon
the legislature to address the issue and decide whether the doctrine should
be expanded." The court expressly disapproved of the Manatee and
Parkway decisions.82
After the Shands decision, the district courts were again inconsistent in
their application of the doctrine of necessaries. Relying on the fact that the
Shands decision had not addressed the equal protection issue, the Second
District again extended the doctrine of necessaries in Webb v. Hillsborough
County HospitalAuthority.83 In Webb, a husband appealed a judgment
entered against him for medical expenses incurred by his wife.84 The
husband claimed that application of the doctrine of necessaries violated his
right to the equal protection of the law.85 The court stated that, unlike the
hospital in Shands, the husband did have standing to raise the issue of
equal protection.86 The court held that the doctrine must expand to hold
wives liable for the necessary expenses of their husbands to avoid violating
equal protection.87
The other district courts were not willing to follow the lead of the
Second District. In two cases, the Fourth District Court of Appeal refused
to hold a wife liable for the necessaries of her husband, relying on the
supreme court's refusal to extend the doctrine.88 In two other cases, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal held husbands liable for the necessary

77. The doctrine of necessaries is primarily based on theories of restitution and
quasi-contract. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 1993).
78. See Shands, 497 So. 2d at 645-46.
79. See id. at 646 n.1.
80. See id. at 645-46; see also Karol Williams, Comment, The Doctrine of Necessaries:
ContemporaryApplicationas a SupportRemedy, 19 STETSONL. REv. 661,662-63 (1990) (stating
that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Shandsleft the common law doctrine of necessaries
intact).
81. See Shands, 497 So. 2d at 646.
82. See id.
83. 521 So. 2d 199,200-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
84. See id. at 200.
85. See id. at 200-01.
86. See id. at 203.
87. See id.at 201.
88. See Faulk v. Palm Beach Gardens Community Hosp., Inc., 589 So. 2d 1029, 1029 (Fla.
4th DCA 1991); Heinemann v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 585 So. 2d 1162,1162 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1991).
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expenses incurred by their wives, while noting that the law did not apply
the doctrine equally. 9
The Second District Court of Appeal further addressed the issue of
whether a wife could be held liable for the necessary expenses incurred by
her husband in Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. v.
Connor.' The court relied upon its own decision in Webb, and ruled that
the wife was liable for the expenses.9 1The court also certified conflict with
the Fourth and Fifth Districts, and requested that the supreme court clarify
the status of the doctrine of necessaries in Florida.'
The supreme court accepted review and abrogated the doctrine of
necessaries in Connor v. Southwest FloridaRegional Medical Center.93
The court began by reviewing the recent history of the doctrine in Florida
and the differing decisions of the district courts. 4 The supreme court then
looked at how other states had addressed the doctrine.95 The court observed
that several states had abrogated the doctrine, while others had extended
the doctrine, and that state legislatures had responded to the issue in a
variety of ways. 9' The court stated that the lack of consensus between the
89. See Waite v. Leesburg Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 582 So. 2d 789, 789-90 (Fla. 5th DCA
1991); Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v Ryals, 526 So. 2d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
90. 643 So. 2d 681 (2d DCA 1994), rev'd, 668 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1995).
91. See id. at 684-85.
92. See id. at 685.
93. 668 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1995).
94. See id. at 176.
95. See id. at 176-77.
96. See id. The court cited three cases where state courts had abrogated the doctrine. These
cases are: Emmanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992); Condom v. Prince George's County,
425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981); and Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hospital, Inc., 303 S.E.2d
905 (Va. 1983). The court failed to cite the Mississippi case, Govan v. Medical Credit Services,
Inc., 621 So. 2d 928 (Miss. 1993), the only other state supreme court to abrogate the doctrine of
necessaries. Virginia has subsequently re-enacted the doctrine. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 55-37
(Michie 1997). The court also cited six cases where state courts expanded the doctrine. These cases
are: Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1993); St. Francis Regional Medical
Center, Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123 (Kan. 1992); Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital
v. Estate ofBaum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980); North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris, 354
S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987); Landmark Medical Center v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994); and
Richland Memorial Hospital v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. 1984). The court failed to mention
three cases where the state supreme courts expanded the doctrine: Cheshire Medical Center v.
Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1244 (N.H. 1995); Kilbourne v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983); and
Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wise. 1982). The court also did not mention the
cases where intermediate state appellate courts have expanded the doctrine. See, e.g., Borgess Med.
Ctr. v. Smith, 386 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Medical Servs. Assocs. v. Perry, 819 S.W.2d
82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Medical Bus. Ass'n, Inc., v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d 890 (App. Div. 1992).
97. See Connor v. Southwest Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., 668 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1995). The
court noted two states which have enacted the common law form of the doctrine, Kentucky and
Oklahoma. See id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 404.040 (Michie 1994); OKiA. STAT. tit. 43, §
209 (1994)). Nevada also has enacted the common law doctrine of necessaries. See NEV. REV.
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states showed that the issue was not one well suited for judicial
determination,98 and that "[t]he fact that courts and other legislatures have
treated this problem in different ways illustrates the lack of consensus
regarding the doctrine's place in modem society and reinforces the position
we took in Shands."99 The court again called upon the legislature to
determine the future of the doctrine, announcing the abrogation of the
°
common law doctrine of necessaries in Florida.1m

STAT. § 123.090(1997). The court also stated that Georgia had repealed its enaction of the common
law doctrine of necessaries in 1979. See id. (citing 1979 Ga. Laws 466, 491). Finally, the court
stated that North Dakota had enacted the doctrine in a modified form, which did not include
medical services. See id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-08 (1993)). However, the court cited to
the wrong North Dakota statute. The court cited to a statute that provided for joint and several
liability when one spouse bought necessary household supplies, which is a more limited rule than
the doctrine of necessaries. See N.D.CENT. CODE § 14-07-08 (1997). North Dakota also has a
statute providing for mutual liability for the necessaries provided to either spouse. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-07-10 (1997). This statute does not limit its definition of necessaries. See id. The court
failed to cite to the state statutes that enacted the doctrine of necessaries, and applied liability to
both spouses. See, e.g., CAL.FAM. CODE § 914 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-37(b) (1997)
(limiting the application of the statute to medical, hospital, rental of a dwelling, and articles
purchased to support the familyor for thejoint benefit of the spouses); HAW. REV. STAT. § 510-8(h)
(1997); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209 § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-201 (1997)
(providing that the wife is only liable after execution upon the husband); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3103.03(c) (Anderson 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-2 (Michie 1997); TEX.FAM. CODEANN.
§ 4.02 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1997). The court also failed to take notice
of the many states that had passed family expense statutes that provide forjoint and several liability
for family expenses. See COLO.REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-37(b)
(1997); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 65/15(a)(1) (West 1997); IOWA CODE § 597.14 (1998); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.040(1) (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-9
(1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-22 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1-201 (Michie 1997). In most jurisdictions, family expenses include all necessaries as well as
many other expenses. See CLARK, supranote 31, § 6.1, at 257-58. Finally, the court failed to note
the states that have passed statutes requiring a person to support his or her spouse. See, e.g., DEL
CODEANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-901 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.110 (1997)
(requiring a wife to support a husband who is unable to support himself); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-2-1 (Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3103.03(A) (Anderson 1997). Support statutes
have been construed as holding spouses liable for necessaries provided to the other spouse. See Jay
M. Zitter, Annotation, Wife's LiabilityforNecessariesFurnishedHusband, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1160 §
5[a] (1996) (citing Swogger v. Sunrise Hosp., Inc., 496 P.2d 751 (Nev. 1972)).
98. See Connor,668 So. 2d at 177.
99. Id.
100. See id.
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111. THE LEGISLATURE'S OPTIONS

A. Maintainthe Status Quo
The legislature's first option is to maintain the status quo, and so far,
this is the course that the legislature has chosen. Some commentators posit
that this is the most appropriate solution.10 ' The arguments in favor of
enacting a doctrine of necessaries applicable to both spouses are more
persuasive, because the doctrine of necessaries furthers several important
public policies. First, the doctrine encourages spouses to support each
other. The doctrine also furthers the policy of encouraging the payment of
just debts. Finally, re-enacting the doctrine of necessaries will protect those
creditors who are not able to protect themselves contractually.
Florida's public policy is that spouses should support each other.102 This
public policy is evidenced by a Florida statute that allows a spouse to seek
support without seeking a dissolution of marriage.10 3 The reciprocity of the
support obligation is reflected by the fact that Florida provides44 for alimony
and alimony pendente lite to be provided by either spouse.'
The public policy of mutual spousal support is also demonstrated in the
significant protection provided surviving spouses in probate proceedings.
For example, the surviving spouse receives a share of at least one-half of
an intestate spouse's estate. 5 Where the deceased spouse had a will, the
share from the probate
surviving spouse can claim a thirty percent elective
6
estate if the will provides less for the spouse.'
Another public policy that provides a strong argument in favor of
reenacting the doctrine is thatjust debts should be paid. An example of this
policy is the rights afforded creditors in probate proceedings. The personal
representative is required to notify creditors of the administration of the

101. See, e.g., Shawn M. Willson, Comment, Abrogating the Doctrine of Necessaries in
Florida:The FutureofSpousalLiabilityforNecessaryExpensesAfterConnorv. Southwest Florida
Regional Medical Center, Inc., 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031, 1052-53 (1997). Willson argues that
the doctrine does not respect the rights of spouses to arrange their own financial affairs, see id. at
1053, and provides more protection to creditors than to spouses, see id. at 1052.
102. See FLA. STAT. § 708.10(1) (1997).
103. See FLA. STAT. § 61.09 (1997).
104. See FLA. STAT. §§ 61.08(1), .071 (1997). In this context, one litigant has argued that
Connor ended the duty of espousal support. See Fernandez v. Fernandez, 710 So.2d 223, 224-25
(Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In Fernandez,a husband attempted to enforce the provision in an antenuptial
agreement which waived his wife's right to temporary alimony during dissolution proceedings. See
id. at 224. The second District held that Connordid not address interspousal support and remanded
for a determination of whether the wife qualified for temporary alimony. See id. at 224-25. The
court certified the issue as one of great public importance to the supreme court. See id. at 225.
105. See FLA. STAT. § 732.102(1) (1997).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 732.207 (1997).
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estate and the rights of creditors to file claims." 7 Additionally, the claims
of creditors are paid before the spouse and other heirs receive an
inheritance.1 08
Currently, it can be very difficult for creditors to enforce their debts
against married couples. In the Rhode Island case, Landmark Medical
Center v. Gauthier,the doctrine enabled a hospital to receive payment on
an otherwise uncollectible debt.1°9 In LandmarkMedical Center,a hospital
sued the husband's widow for payment of medical expenses associated
with the husband's last illness. 0 The wife had not signed a contract
guaranteeing her husband's medical bills."1 The only marital asset was1a2
three-unit apartment building that the spouses owned as joint tenants.'
When the husband died, the building transferred by operation of law to the
wife, with no probate proceeding." 3 Since there was no probate
proceeding, the hospital did not have an opportunity to file a claim against
the husband's estate." 4 The hospital could only seek payment from the
wife under the doctrine of necessaries."' The court extended the doctrine
and held the wife liable for the medical expenses.1 6
Part of the difficulty in collecting a debt from married couples is that
a creditor cannot execute on jointly held property for the debt of one
spouse."' Additionally, many marital assets are either exempt or
homestead property." There are also limitations on the doctrine of
necessaries that prevent its successful use. 9 Because of these limitations,
the doctrine of necessaries will offer some, but not complete, protection for

107. See FLA. STAT. § 733.212 (1997).
108. See FLA. STAT. § 733.707(1)-(2) (1997). Notably, funeral expenses, and medical and
hospital expenses from the last illness, all of which are necessaries, are specifically included in the
list of priorities. See FLA. STAT. § 733.707(1)(b), (d). The family allowance does have priority over
the claims of some creditors, see FLA. STAT. §§ 732.403, 733.707(1) (1997), but this is generally

not a significant amount.
109. 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994).
110. Seeid. at 1146.
111. Seeid. at 1154.
112. Seeid. at 1146.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1148-49.
116. See id. at 1152.
117. See Meyer v. Faust, 83 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. 1955). The spouse who did not incur the
debt must be joined in the lawsuit. See id. Each spouse must have a "full and fair hearing" on
whether that spouse's property interest may be held liable for the debt. Id. Under Florida law, this
is unlikely because the property interests of one spouse will not be held available for debts of the
other spouse. See FLA. STAT. § 708.08(1); Blackshear Mfg. Co. v. McClenny, 78 So. 269,269 (Fla.
1918).

118. See 24A FLA. JUR. Executions §§ 32-35 (1997).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51.
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most creditors.
The doctrine of necessaries provides a remedy for creditors who cannot
protect themselves by forcing spouses to join in the contract.12 In holding
that the doctrine of necessaries should be expanded to find the wife liable,
the court in Landmark Medical Center considered the contention that a
creditor can protect its interests by having the spouse join in the contract,
or by taking a security interest in the assets of a patient.12 The court
pointed out that hospitals are not able to protect themselves because they
must treat patients, even where there is no contract.' The court also stated
that "[riequiring a hospital to secure payment for services before rendering
treatment would lead to delay and hardship for both the hospital and the
patients awaiting treatment."'2 From an economic viewpoint, the state
should provide a remedy that allows hospitals to seek payment from a
spouse. By allowing such a remedy, the state can help prevent the
continuing rise in the cost of medical care.
The status quo is not an ideal situation. Spouses are obligated to
support each other.'24 They are able to avoid doing so, however, by not
paying debts that have been incurred by one spouse. The state should
provide a remedy to allow creditors to utilize the courts and collect just
debts. Even if the legislature decides not to fully re-enact the doctrine of
necessaries, they should enact legislation that provides protection for
medical care providers and hospitals-groups that are not able to protect
themselves contractually."2 This may help to stem the constantly
increasing cost of medical care.
Should the legislature enact the doctrine of necessaries, however, it
must decide how it will hold spouses liable. The legislature has two
choices: it can apply joint and several liability; or it can find a way to
apportion the liability between the two spouses. The next two sections
address these options.

120. See Landmark Medical Center 635 A. 2d at 1154; see also infra note 122. But see
Willson, supra note 101, at 1051 (arguing that creditors can protect themselves contractually).
121. See 635 A. 2d at 1154.
122. See id. Federal law requires any hospital that accepts Medicare funding to provide
emergency treatment for any patient who enters the emergency department and requests treatment,
even in those cases where there is not, in fact, an emergency medical condition. See generally
GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 339-45 (6th ed. 1996)
(discussing hospitals' duty of care to Medicare patients).
123. Landmark Med. Ctr., 635 A.2d at 1154.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
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B. Enact the Doctrinewith Joint and Several Liability
Most legislatures that have enacted spousal liability for necessary
expenses have applied joint and several liability for the expenses. 126 This
option is the most protective of creditors. Creditors could choose between
suing the spouse most able to pay, or joining both spouses in a lawsuit.127
There are two problems with this form of liability, though. First, it does not
respect the rights of spouses to determine how they will order their
128 Second, it will tend to inequitably distribute the cost of
financial affairs.
129
necessaries.
One commentator who opposes enactment of the doctrine of
necessaries in Florida has correctly pointed out that not all spouses choose
to combine their earnings and assets.13 °Many couples enter into prenuptial
agreements, or otherwise maintain separate property. 31 The law should
recognize these decisions. One of the greatest weaknesses of joint and
several liability is that the spouse who did not contract could face
attachment of assets, even before the creditors
attempted to collect from
13 2
necessaries.
the
received
who
spouse
the
The other major difficulty with assigning joint and several liability
under the doctrine is that this approach can create hardships for a
dependent spouse. 133 The purpose of the doctrine of necessaries is to
protect a dependent spouse. 34 A dependent spouse might face liability for
3
significant necessary expenses regardless of that spouse's ability to pay.1 1

126. California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
Texas, and Virginia have all enacted laws holding each spouse liable for the necessaries provided
to the other spouse. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 914 (West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 510-8(h) (1997);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209 § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-10 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03(c) (Anderson 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-2 (Michie 1997);
Tax. FAM. CODE § 4.02 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1997). Other states provide
joint and several liability under family expenses statutes. These states include: Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-6-110 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-37 (1997) (limiting the application of the
statute to medical, hospital, rental of a dwelling, and articles purchased to support the family, or for
the joint benefit of the spouses); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 65/15(a)(1) (West 1997); IOWA CODE §
597.14 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-106 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.040 (1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-2-9 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-201
(Michie 1997).
127. Cf. Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. 618 N.E. 2d 1, 6 (Ind. 1993).
128. See Willson, supra note 101, at 1046-48.
129. See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 6.
130. See Willson, supra note 101, at 1046-47.
131. See id. at 1047.
132. See Bartrom, 618 N.E. 2d at 6.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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Joint and several liability might also impair the ability of a spouse to gain
independent creditworthiness. 36 Hence, the goal of the doctrine could be
thwarted.
Several courts have rejected the application of joint and several
liability. 13 7 In Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Estate of
Baum,138 the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided not to apply joint and
several liability to spouses under the doctrine of necessaries.'39 The court
stated that applying joint and several liability would be "equality with a
vengeance" because it would provide no protection to spouses and would
give creditors the same rights as if both spouses were contractually
liable. 4 The court stated that such an approach might create a hardship for
" ' The court instead decided to apportion liability between the
families.14
spouses, rather than holding each spouse equally liable."2
C. Enact the Doctrine andApportion Liability
Holding spouses equally liable for necessary expenses tends to create
inequitable results. 143 Therefore, it would be appropriate for the legislature
to consider ways to apportion liability between the two spouses. There are
two primary approaches to apportioning liability that have been
implemented in different states.
Nebraska and Wisconsin currently apportion liability for necessaries
primarily to the husband.'" When the husband's assets are insufficient to
cover any necessary expense, the wife is secondarily liable.145 The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin considered this approach in Marshfield Clinic v.
Discher,'4 and held that it did not violate constitutional equal protection
requirements.1 47 The court reasoned that husbands and wives are not
similarly situated.148 The court stated that "wives have made substantial
economic gains in the past decade, but substantial economic disparities still

136. See id. at7.
137. See, e.g., id. at 8; St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Kan.
1992); Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d 1003 at 1010.
138. 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980).
139. See id. at 1010.
140. Id. at 1009.
141. See id. at 1010.
142. See id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 137-47.
144. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-201 (1997); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326,
327-28 (Wisc. 1982).
145. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-201 (1997); Marshfield Clinic, 314 N.W.2d at 327-28.
146.. 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wisc. 1982).
147. See id. at 328.
148. See id. at 331.
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' The Nebraska law has not faced
persist between husbands and wives."149
a constitutional challenge in federal court. While these laws are currently
valid, it is probable that this system will be found to violate equal
protection principles in the near future. 5 ° Because constitutional problems
with this approach are likely, Florida should consider other alternatives.
The most attractive alternative is the one adopted by the several states
that hold the spouse who incurred the necessary expense primarily liable
for payment.151 The other spouse becomes secondarily liable when the
spouse who incurred the expense does not have sufficient assets to satisfy
the debt.'52 This approach is probably the best system of apportioning
liability because it appears tnot to contravene the goal of the doctrine of
necessaries, and because there are no equal protection problems with this
approach-husbands and wives are treated equally. 153 The only difference
in treatment is based on who incurred the necessary expense.'54 This
approach also provides respect to the financial arrangements of married
couples while still providing an obligation to pay just debts.
This approach was adopted in 1980 by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Jersey Shore.'55 Several other courts have since adopted it.'56 The
courts adopting this approach point out that placing primary liability on the
spouse incurring the expense provides protection to a financially dependent
spouse. 57 Where a financially independent spouse incurs the necessary
expense, that spouse's assets will satisfy the debt.' 5 The financially
dependent spouse will only have liability when he or she incurs the
expense.' 59 Where spouses are interdependent, the spouse who does not

149. Id.
150. See Note, The UnnecessaryDoctrine of Necessaries,supra note 12, at 1778.
151. Courts in Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and South
Carolina have held that the spouse who incurs the debt is primarily liable, and the other spouse is
secondarily liable. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E. 2d 1, 8 (Ind. 1993); St.
Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Bowles, 836 P. 2d 1123,1128 (Kan. 1992); Medical Servs. Assocs.
v. Perry, 819 S.W. 2d 82,83 (Mo. Ct. App 1991); Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. Holbrook, 663 A. 2d 1244,
1347 (N.H. 1995); Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.- Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A. 2d 1003, 1010
(N.J. 1980); Medical Bus. Assocs., Inc. v. Steiner, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 890, 897 (App. Div. 1992);
Anderson Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Hagen, 443 S.E.2d 399,401 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
152. See sources cited supra note 151.
153. See Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d at 1009-10.
154. See id. at 1010.
155. See id. at 1009-10.
156. Courts that have adopted this approach include the Supreme Court of Indiana, the
Supreme Court of Kansas, two district courts of appeals in Missouri, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, the appellate divisions of two supreme courts in New York, and an appellate court in
South Carolina. See sources cited supra note 150.
157. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E. 2d 1, 6-8 (Ind. 1993).
158. See id. at 8.
159. See id.
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incur the expense will continue to have protection until the assets of the
spouse who incurred the debt are exhausted."6
Assigning primary liability to the spouse who incurs the necessary
expense respects agreements between spouses to maintain separate
property. 61 Only after the separate property of the debt-incurring spouse
is exhausted will jointly held property or the separate property of the other
spouse be required to meet the legal obligation of support.l' 2 This approach
63
provides protection for separate assets, dependent spouses, and creditors.
Because this approach balances all applicable interests, this is the most
attractive approach for Florida.
D. Necessary Limitations on the Doctrine ofNecessaries
The common law doctrine of necessaries provided several limitations
to protect the husband who was required to pay expenses incurred by his
wife."6 If the legislature chooses to enact the doctrine of necessaries, it
should maintain some of these limitations so that the doctrine protects
more than just creditors. The legislature might also consider additional
limitations, as noted below.
65
Under the common law, the definition of a necessary was very broad.
The legislature could maintain this broad definition, and allow the courts
to determine what limitations on the doctrine should exist. The legislature
might also determine that the common law definition is too broad, and
could limit the doctrine of necessaries by carefully defining which
necessary expenses are to be included.
If the legislature decides to define necessaries more narrowly, it will
need to determine which interests are most in need of protection. As
already discussed, hospitals are one class of creditors that are limited in
their ability to protect themselves contractually. " At the very least, a
narrow definition of necessaries ought to include hospital expenses. Such
a definition would limit the actions that could be brought, but would still
allow hospitals some fiscal security in rendering needed medical care.

160. See id.
161. See Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.- Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A. 2d 1003, 1010 (N.J.
1980).
162. See id.
163. Seeki.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23. Notably, all of the recent reported cases in
Florida dealing with the doctrine of necessaries have sought payment of hospital expenses. See
Bora, supra note 1, at 423 n.162 (stating that no case has been reported in Florida in the last 50
years other than cases seeking payment of hospital expenses). This points out the particular need
of hospitals for protection under the doctrine.
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There is, however, an advantage to broadly defining necessaries. Courts
have long been able to limit the application of the doctrine of
necessaries. 67 This should be allowed to continue. By allowing courts
discretion to determine whether an expense is necessary, the legislature
would leave the doctrine flexible enough to change over time. 16 This
flexibility will keep the doctrine a viable source of protection for both
spouses and creditors.
One common law protection under the doctrine of necessaries that the
legislature should retain is limiting the liability of the spouse who did not
receive the necessaries.1 69 The Bartrom court limited this liability to the
extent of the spouse's ability to pay on the date that the debt was
incurred.' This limitation provides spouses additional protection from
their creditors because future increases in wealth will not increase
liability. 171
Another limitation that the legislature must address is whether liability
will continue once the spouses have separated. At common law, the
husband remained liable for his wife's post-separation necessaries unless
the wife was responsible for the separation or guilty of scandalous
behavior.72 Modem courts and legislatures have split over how to treat
liability for necessaries when the spouses have separated. Many
statutes-such as one that exists in Virginia'73 and the bills that were introduced during the 1996 and 1997 Florida Legislative Sessions-terminate
the liability once the spouses have permanently separated. 7 4 Because
spousal interests are not severed until equitable distribution occurs at the

167. See supra text accompanying notes 36-51.
168. See Willson, supra note 101, at 1047 (noting that theories of marriage have changed in
the past and are likely to change in the future).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
170. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E. 2d 1, 8 (Ind. 1993).
171. See id. at 6 (noting that holding both spouses fully liable for the necessary debt will leave
both spouses "unable to provide for themselves or their family").
172. Seeid. at9-10.
173. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-37 (Michie 1997).
174. See H.R. 349, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess., §12 (Fla.); H.R. 1211, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1
(Fla.); S. 906,1996 Leg., Reg. Sess., § I (Fla.). The Virginia statute provides in part: "Thedoctrine
of necessaries as it existed at common law shall apply equally to both spouses, except where they
are permanently living separate and apart, but shall in no event create any liability between such
spouses as to each other." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1997). Florida House Bill 1211 and
Senate Bill 906 provide in part: "The husband and wife are liable jointly and severally for any debts
contracted by either, while living together, for necessary household supplies of food, clothing, and
fuel, for medical care, and for shelter for themselves and family, and for the education of their
minor children." Fla. H.R. 1211, § 1; Fla. S. 906, § 1. Committee Substitute for House Bill 349
provided in part: "Hospital bills are considered family expenses in which the husband and wife,
while living together, arejointly and severally liable for each other and their minor children." Fla.
H.R. 349, §12.
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dissolution of the marriage the termination of liability is problematic where
the spouses own assets jointly.'75 If the liability for necessaries ends with
separation, a creditor will have no remedy, because the assets will not yet
have been distributed.' This would be particularly unjust in a situation
where the spouses later resolved their differences and reconciled.
Termination of liability at separation also fails to protect the dependent
spouse during the divorce proceedings.
Some courts have ruled that the liability should continue for debts
incurred up to the date of dissolution.' Where a court has ordered
temporary support, however, the court limits liability to the amount of the
temporary support order at the date the debt was incurred.' Continuing
liability until dissolution will provide protection to creditors while not
presenting a significant risk to separated spouses. This is probably the
preferable option-particularly because the law allows a separated spouse
to file an action
to determine support obligations, independent of a divorce
179
proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of necessaries has had a long history in Florida. It was first
applied in the 1895 case of Phillipsv. Sanchez, 80 when the Supreme Court
of Florida required the estate of the husband to pay for the necessaries
incurred by the wife.' That same court has now ended this history with its
decision to abrogate the doctrine in Connor.'82 Unfortunately, the
abrogation of the doctrine has left a significant gap in Florida's law. 8 3
The doctrine of necessaries did provide protection to spouses in
Florida." 4 In particular, the doctrine protected financially dependent
spouses-historically the wives-from being neglected. 5 Where the
financially independent spouse did not provide support, the dependent

175. See Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 8-9.
176. See id.
177. See, e.g., id. at 9.
178. See id.
179. See FLA. STAT. § 61.09 (1997).
180. 17 So. 363 (Fla. 1895).
181. See id. at 364-65. In Phillips,the necessary expense of the wife was hiring someone to
provide medical care to her husband. See id. at 363-64. The husband's estate was held liable for
payment of the medical care expenses. See id. at 365.
182. 668 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1995).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 102-25.
184. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1986).
But see Willson, supra note 101, at 1052 (stating that the doctrine of necessaries frequently
provides more protection to creditors than to spouses).
185. See Shands, 497 So. 2d at 645.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss5/4

20

Simons: Is the Doctrine of Necessaries Necessary in Florida: Should the L
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES IN FLORIDA

spouse was still able to receive necessaries.'86 The doctrine provided a
suitable means of enforcing a spouse's duty to provide support, while
preventing contentious interspousal litigation.'87
The doctrine also protected creditors. Creditors could provide for the
needs of a married person, and then seek payment from the spouse who
was able to pay. 88 Without the doctrine, creditors have to seek financial
guarantees, and will frequently not be willing to meet the needs of
necessitous spouses. Some creditors-who cannot protect themselves
because of governmental regulation-will be left with no remedy except
increasing prices for all clients.' 89
The legislature should act to address this gap in the law of Florida. The
legislature should first consider how broadly it wishes to act. It can choose
to provide protection only for those creditors least able to protect
themselves-such as hospitals. In the alternative, the legislature can make
the doctrine broad and flexible and allow the courts to equitably determine
when the doctrine should apply.
The legislature must also determine how to apply the doctrine to
spouses even-handedly. Holding each spouse equally liable for the
necessary expenses of either is "equality with a vengeance."' 9 This
approach does not recognize the rights of married individuals to arrange
their own financial affairs. 9 ' The legislature should protect these rights by
applying primary liability to the spouse who incurs the expense. 9 2 The
spouse who does not incur the necessary expense should only be held
liable when the spouse who incurred the liability does not have sufficient
the spouse incurring the debt
assets to satisfy the debt, for example, when
93
is a home-maker with no separate assets.1
The legislature needs to provide other protections as well. The spouse
who is required to pay for necessaries incurred by the other should only be
required to pay based on his or her ability to pay when the debt was

186. See id.
187. Under coverture, the wife was notable to sue her husband directly in order to enforce his
duty to provide support. See supra text accompanying notes 12-18.
188. See Connor,668 So. 2d at 175.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
190. Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.- Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A. 2d 1003, 1009 (N.J.
1980); see supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
191. As noted above, the rights of spouses to maintain separate property and to determine how
they will apportion debts between themselves should be balanced by their obligation to pay their
just debts. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 156-63.
193. This approach balances the needs of creditors to be paid with the ability of spouses to
determine how to separate property. Spouses can determine for themselves how to pay their bills.
When they are not willing to do this, the state should provide a remedy for creditors to seek
payment. See supra text accompanying notes 156-63.
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incurred.19 4 The legislature should also protect the financially dependent
spouse by maintaining liability for necessaries until a final divorce decree
is entered. 95
The following appendices provide two proposals for the legislature to
consider. Each is based on the considerations within this Note. The
proposals are drawn from the decisions made by courts and legislatures in
other states.
Appendix A is a model for a general enactment of the doctrine of
necessaries. This proposal has a very broad definition of what constitutes
a necessary expense, and will allow courts discretion in determining the
future course of the doctrine. The proposal also contains many of the
restrictions that applied to the doctrine under the common law. The
proposal continues liability during a separation until a support or
dissolution order is entered. The proposed statute is numbered to be placed
in Chapter 708 of the FloridaStatutes with the laws dealing with Married
Women's Property in Florida, which includes a provision requiring
husbands to support their wives.%
Appendix B is more limited in scope. This proposal applies the doctrine
only to medical and hospital expenses. The proposal is intended to provide
protection for the medical industry, which, due to government regulations,
is frequently unable to protect itself contractually. 197 Due to its narrow
definition of necessaries, this proposal contains fewer limitations on the
doctrine. This proposed statuted is numbered to be placed in Chapter 395
of the FloridaStatutes with other laws relating to hospital and medical
bills.

194.
195.
196.
197.

See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-87.
See FLA. STAT. § 708.10(1) (1997).
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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APPENDICES

A. GeneralProposal
708.11 Liability for Necessaries Provided to Spouse(1)
A person is liable to the creditors of the person's spouse for the
reasonable cost of necessaries provided to the spouse.
(2)
Necessaries shall include, but are not limited to: food, clothing,
shelter, medical services, hospital expenses, and dental services.
(3)
The liability of a person for necessaries provided to his or her
spouse shall continue after the separation of the spouses, until a final order
of dissolution of marriage is entered, unless pending a dissolution of
marriage an order for temporary support has been entered obligating the
married person to support the spouse who has received the necessaries, or
if an adjudication has been entered relieving the married person from the
obligation to support the spouse who has received the necessaries.
(4)

(a) No assets of a married person may be attached for the debts
incurred by that person's spouse for necessaries unless execution
against the assets of the spouse who received the necessaries is
insufficient to satisfy the debt.
(b) The liability of a person for the debts incurred by that person's
spouse for necessaries is limited by the person's ability to pay the
debt on the date the debt was incurred.
(c) A person will not be held liable for the debts incurred by that
person's spouse for necessaries where it can be shown that the
creditor relied solely on the credit of the spouse who received the
necessary in agreeing to provide the necessary items or services.
The creditor shall bear the burden of producing evidence that he or
she did not rely solely on the credit of the spouse in allowing the
debt to be incurred.
(d) A creditor may sue both spouses jointly in an action to recover
the cost of necessaries provided to one spouse.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 5 [], Art. 4
FLORIDA L4WREVIEW

J",/o. so

B. Limited Proposal
395.3011 Liability for medical services and hospital expenses provided to
spouse and children(1) A person is liable for the reasonable uninsured cost of necessary
services and hospitalization services provided to or on behalf of:
(a) the person;
(b) the person's spouse, provided such costs were incurred during
the marriage;
(c) the person's children.
(2) A married person may be held liable for the medical and hospital
expenses of his or her spouse only after the assets of the spouse who
incurred the debt have been executed upon, and been found to be
insufficient to provide for the expense. This provision shall not prevent the
joinder of both spouses in a suit to recover medical or hospital expenses.
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